Global Analysis 2025/26 - Global Overview

The global policy environment for the protection of human rights and those who defend them was seriously weakened in 2025. The massive fundings cuts implemented by the administration of United States President Donald Trump shortly after his inauguration in January directly impacted thousands of human rights organisations. These cuts, combined with those of Germany and the United Kingdom, amounted to 84% (US$53 billion) of the projected 2026 ODA cuts (HRFN, 2025), reducing drastically the global pool of support to marginalised communities. Front Line Defenders surveyed 60 international and regional civil society organisations engaged, to varying degrees, in protection of human rights defenders and found that they had lost more than €45 million annually in direct protection support since January 2025. Concurrently, 83% of respondents reported an increase in emergency grant requests from HRDs since January 2025.

In parallel, states’ failure to pay their UN fees on time – most significantly the United States - exacerbated the organisation’s budgetary crisis. This has contributed to the scaling back of human rights monitoring missions and the inability of human rights mechanisms to adequately fulfil their mandates. The effects of these cuts are not abstract: Colombia, one of the world’s most dangerous countries for HRDs, has seen its policies and initiatives for conflict resolution and peacebuilding weakened due to a significant reduction in international cooperation, particularly from USAID. In June, due to budget constraints, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia announced the dismissal of nearly half of its staff and the closure of three offices in areas affected by the armed conflict. InspiraPaz, a US$20 million USAID-funded project to prevent human rights violations in conflict areas, strengthen community resilience and develop alternatives, was also wound down.

Accountability efforts were not just hampered by funding cuts; they were also undermined by an unprecedented attack on a key global mechanism for combating immunity for serious human rights violations – the International Criminal Court (ICC). The United States Government imposed sanctions on ICC officials and judges following the Court’s issuance of arrest warrants in November 2024 for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant in relation to alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The scale and scope of these measures expanded rapidly: initial designations targeted the ICC Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutors, and several judges, directly impacting the Court’s ability to operate independently and effectively. By July, the sanctions had extended to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967 (or UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory), Francesca Albanese. In September, key Palestinian human rights organizations documenting violations to enable future accountability – including Al-Haq, Al Mezan, and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights – were sanctioned. Parallel measures against another Palestinian human rights organisation, Addameer, were adopted in June, when the organisation was sanctioned by the United States Treasury on purported counter-terrorism grounds. The impact of the sanctions on Palestinian human rights organisations has been profound, with rapid funding withdrawals, staff lay-offs, full refusal of banking facilities (effectively preventing them from using the international banking system) and serious limitations on other NGOs’ ability to support them. Documentary evidence from the sanctioned organisations exposing human rights violations by the Israeli army was also removed from United States-owned internet platforms. Calls for an EU response, including the blocking statute,1 have been met with inaction and indifference. The United States government’s attack on the ICC, as well as human rights organisations providing evidence to it, demonstrates the efforts taken to ensure that accountability for the most serious human rights abuses only takes place when it coincides with the interests of the United States government.

The incremental strangulation of independent civil society continued apace at the global level, where a raft of new legislation (see later in this analysis) was proposed or introduced. Such actions were often combined with administrative measures to limit the ability of HRDs and organisations to obtain resources, develop a domestic constituency or engage international support. This type of multi-pronged attack occurred in multiple countries, including in Georgia where the Law on Registration of Foreign Agents (FARA) was enacted in April. FARA requires individuals or organisations to register as ‘foreign agents’ if they engage in a wide variety of acts, including ‘political activities’ that are carried out ‘on behalf of’ a foreign entity. In practice, this means that organisations in receipt of foreign funding – a right protected under the HRD Declaration – will be targeted. In addition to the bureaucratic hurdles such a law poses, it is deeply stigmatising to HRDs and organisations conducting outreach to the general public. In parallel, the bank accounts of a number of human rights organisations relating to election monitoring, good governance and democracy were frozen in June 2025. Such organisations were accused by the Prosecutor General of supporting the 2024 violent protests which occurred in reaction to the return of the Georgian Dream Party to government.

The Trump administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in February 2025 and was soon followed by Israel. Nicaragua withdrew its membership that same month, following the publication of a report by the HRC-mandated Group of Human Rights Experts on the country which found that President Daniel Ortega had consolidated state control over the population “through widespread repression,” including through the arbitrary detention of HRDs. As WHRDs were confronted with further rollbacks on women’s rights, the United States administration contributed to an increasingly hostile environment through its public opposition to language relating to “gender” at the UN Commission on the Status of Women in New York in March. This came at a time when a new report by UN Women, to mark 30 years since the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action on women’s rights, noted that “anti-rights actors are actively undermining long-standing consensus on key women’s rights issues.”

In the European Union, landmark efforts to regulate the human rights and environmental impacts of corporations were significantly debilitated through the “Omnibus I” package, introduced under the banner of reducing regulatory burdens and improving competitiveness, after heavy lobbying by businesses. The revisions substantially diluted the original ambition of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and weakened protections for affected communities and defenders .The revised text reduces the number of companies covered by the directive by around 70%. It also limits the ability of companies to request information from smaller business partners, weakening supply-chain transparency and reducing the effectiveness of due diligence processes. In addition, the definition of stakeholders was narrowed, and consultation obligations were reduced during key stages. The revised directive further removes the obligation for companies to suspend or terminate relationships with business partners linked to serious harm where that harm cannot be prevented. Furthemore, the Omnibus I package removed harmonised EU-wide civil liability provisions and support for representative actions that could have helped victims overcome barriers when seeking justice in European courts. Instead, enforcement will largely depend on national legal systems, creating fragmented standards across member states, which will create barriers for victims of corporate abuse and increase opportunities for companies to exploit gaps between national regimes.

The principle of the universality of human rights came under renewed pressure in Europe when 27 of the 46 Council of Europe member states signed onto a joint statement calling for amendments to be made to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). One of the proposed amendments is that Article 3, which provides protection against torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment, be “constrained to the most serious issues,” when considering expulsion of non-nationals convicted of criminal offences. As detailed below, HRDs protecting the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees already work within a context where they are treated with heavy suspicion, subjected to smear campaigns and criminalised for their work. Qualifying whose rights are protected under the ECHR poses further challenges to this work. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O’Flaherty noted that “the careless association of migration with criminality is wrong and dangerous”, and stressed the “need to respect the universality of human rights. Any discourse that suggests a hierarchy of rights holders on the basis of their being more or less deserving is deeply problematic.”

Notwithstanding these headwinds, the year did provide a number of positive policy advances at the international, regional, national and local levels. Among the most significant of these was the Advisory Opinion issued by the International Court of Justice affirming that states have binding legal obligations under international human rights law to address climate change, highlighting that a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is a precondition for the enjoyment of human rights. This opinion also represents an important recognition of the years-long struggle of environmental and indigenous peoples’ rights defenders, who have consistently opposed the degradation of their natural environment on the grounds of human rights, and who, as a result, have been relentlessly targeted.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) handed down its own Advisory Opinion in July on the climate emergency and human rights, in which the crucial role of HRDs in climate governance and protection is highlighted. The opinion stresses the heightened risk that environmental defenders face and the duties of States to prevent attacks against them, including through the use of due diligence and national protection mechanisms. The intersectional risks faced by Indigenous, Afro-descendant, rural and women HRDs was noted, with calls made for a nuanced protection approach.

At the national level, Guatemala approved the Public Policy for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders 2025-2035. This framework was adopted to comply with a 2014 IACHR ruling instructing the state to develop a comprehensive protection system for defenders which recognises the legitimacy of human rights work and focuses on protection, prevention, access to justice and reparation. While this policy represents a significant and normative advance in the region, civil society has underlined that its implementation, adequate resourcing, and the effective participation of defenders, particularly indigenous, rural, and women defenders, will be decisive in determining whether it translates into real improvements for HRDs.

Elsewhere in the Americas, the Brazilian Government launched the National Plan for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. The plan establishes an inter-ministerial committee to monitor the situation of HRDs in the country and develop measures to address it, including monitoring the performance of the National Protection Mechanism under the accompaniment of civil society. This initiative follows years of sustained advocacy by civil society organisations and gained momentum following IACHR rulings holding Brazil accountable for its failure to protect HRDs. Throughout the year, the Chilean Congress drafted a bill to establish a policy on the protection of environmental defenders which passed first stage in lower chamber and is pending discussion in the Senate. Despite these positive steps, expectations remain low in light of the ongoing weakening of human rights policies under President José Antonio Kast’s government, which, in March 2026, withdrew the country’s proposed Third National Human Rights Action Plan (2026–2029).

At the local level in the Philippines, Quezon City became one of at least six localities to adopt an ordinance designed to protect HRDs. The ordinance acknowledges the “vital role of human rights defenders”, confirms their rights and commits to the creation of a Human Rights Defenders Protection Committee to “develop and implement policies to protect HRDs from threats and violence.” As the number of administrative divisions with protection ordinances grow, HRDs hope that this momentum will translate into the adoption of the long-delayed National Human Rights Defenders Protection Law.

1According to the European Union, the purpose of the blocking statute (Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96) is “to protect EU operators from the extra-territorial application of third country laws. The European Union does not recognise the extra-territorial application of laws adopted by third countries and considers such effects to be contrary to international law.”

In a context defined by the proliferation of armed conflicts and other crises, human rights defenders were forced to constantly adapt their strategies to allow for them to continue delivering for their communities. From the fourth year of the full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine; the war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide against Palestinians by the Israeli authorities in OPT; the 12-day war in Iran; the escalating violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan; growing gang-control in Haiti; border tensions between Thailand and Cambodia; the ongoing civil war in Myanmar; to the continued conflict in Yemen and the human rights crisis in Afghanistan, defenders operated in environments where state and non-state actors consistently target those supporting their communities or documenting violations. These environments presented unique and compounded risks, where, for example in Myanmar, the military government “has criminalised the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, locking up journalists and human rights defenders who report on the junta’s actions and abuses.”

Whether in Sudan, Ukraine, Gaza or the DRC, HRDs were targeted directly for their work documenting human rights violations and exposing abuses. The HRD Memorial recorded the killing of 32 defenders engaged in such work in Palestine, Sudan and Ukraine. The targeting of journalists and HRDs in such contexts has a chilling effect, designed to discourage others from exposing abuses.

Defenders on the frontlines of these catastrophes faced a scale of threats that overwhelmed protection mechanisms, challenging organisations to coordinate and verify cases amidst volatile conditions, namely with internet blackouts and reduced funding. What follows are not exhaustive accounts, but illustrative examples of a pervasive trend: the systematic targeting of those who persisted in their promotion of rights amidst the violence of sustained conflicts.

This trend was evident in the murder of WHRD and civil servant Iftehan Al-Mashahri, who was shot dead in September in the city of Taiz in Yemen. Director of the Cleanliness and Improvement Fund and tasked with “keeping Taiz’s basic services running amid the chaos of war”, the WHRD had previously faced down armed individuals who had attempted to extort her in her work. In the weeks prior to her killing, she reportedly told friends that “the noose is tightening”. The assassination was roundly condemned by local civil society as an attack on civic leadership and women’s participation in public life. Following her killing, sustained public protests erupted, with demonstrators and rights organisations demanding accountability and an end to impunity.

Image: 2025, El Obeid, Sudan – Emergency Response Rooms of Sudan’s activities in El-Obeid, capital of the state of North Kordofan.ERR received the 2025 Right Livelihood Award and 2025 Rafto Prize for their lifesaving work amid Sudan’s internal armed conflict. © LCC- Emergency Response Room of North Kordofan

The situation in Sudan remained dire, where the warring parties of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), were joined by new armed groups. The conflict has led to the displacement of over 12 million people. Defenders, particularly those staffing Emergency Response Rooms1 (ERRs), faced targeted attacks, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, death sentences and killings. In August 2025, ERR volunteer Khalid al-Zubair Al-Malih (“Khalid Esti”) died in SAF custody, having been detained since 2023 on ungrounded accusations of collaboration with the RSF. In November Al-Fadil Ismail Adam Abdelbari, known as “Awfy,” was arrested by the RSF in the main market of Zalingei, Central Darfur and held for over a month. A volunteer with the ERRs in Zalingei, the HRD is widely recognised in his community for his humanitarian and voluntary work. Healthcare workers in Sudan have played a key role defending the right to health and have been targeted for treating the wounded or refusing to abandon their patients. Journalists, lawyers and others have all paid a high price for their persistence in supporting their communities and exposing human rights abuses in the context of the war. The HRD Memorial recorded three cases in Sudan in 2025 where HRDs were targeted and killed because of their work documenting violations.

In the Occupied Palestinian Territory/Israel, the bombardment of Gaza, mass displacement and the military ground incursion created an impossible environment for defenders. A number of local Palestinian and Israeli organisations, as well as international NGOs and the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory concluded that a genocide was being committed against the Palestinian people in Gaza. The HRD Memorial documented the killing of 42 HRDs in Gaza in 2025. HRDs reporting on violations or those defending the right to health and life were targeted by the Israeli Defence Forces with arrest, torture and killings. Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya, director of Kamal Adwan Hospital, was arrested in late 2024 for refusing to evacuate the hospital. At the time of writing, he remained in administrative detention without trial or charge, and has been reportedly tortured. He reported being subjected to “to severe physical abuse, including beatings with batons and electric shock sticks, as well as repeated blows to the chest” and denied medical treatment despite developing severe scabies.

In the West Bank, a growing pattern of settler attacks, arrests, assaults, property destruction, land grabbing and intimidation targeting human rights defenders and their communities was observed. One HRD, Odeh Hathalin, was recorded as killed by the HRD Memorial in 2025, murdered by an Israeli settler in July. In December, Israeli occupation forces carried out coordinated military raids on the offices of the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) in Ramallah and Hebron. During these raids, IDF soldiers reportedly destroyed the office infrastructure, seized documents and equipment, physically assaulted staff and detained eight individuals who were present on the premises. The organisation provides essential agricultural, developmental, and humanitarian assistance to farmers and rural communities in the West Bank, including those facing settler violence, land confiscation, and the risk of forced displacement. It was one of six leading Palestinian civil society organisations designated as ‘terrorist’ by Israeli authorities in 2021, with no substantial evidence provided to back up this assertion. According to the UN Human Rights Office in Palestine, the attack on UAWC “followed weeks of harassment and public incitement by Israeli settlers and leaders of settler groups, particularly citing UAWC’s work during the olive harvest season.”

Iran was an evident example of the devastating impact of conflict on societies where the space to defend human rights is already severely restricted, during the Twelve-Day War (13-25 June). HRDs’ lives and their physical and psychological well-being were drastically affected by Israeli and US airstrikes and the Iranian response, while freedom of expression and access to information were both further restricted. In June, the Israeli air force attacked the Evin compound, where Evin prison is located and where numerous HRDs are imprisoned. Defenders spoke of their terror during the attacks in which, according to a spokesperson of the Iranian Judiciary System, more than 70 people were killed. Following the attacks, prisoners were transferred to alternative jails where they endured poor hygiene conditions and lacked access to essential supplies.

“We [human rights defenders] have written so many times, that we are against any war, attacks on homeland and its people. Unfortunately, our agency was not taken into account in any of circumstances leading to current situation. However, we can be each other’s refuge in this difficult time, we do have agency over this matter.” (Human rights defender Mohammad Habibi on social media on 16 June 2025)

In the DRC, the situation for human rights defenders deteriorated rapidly following the takeover of Goma by the ‘Mouvement du 23 Mars’ (M23) in January. HRDs in North and South Kivu faced severe risk from both M23 and government forces, including enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and targeted violence against them and family members. Front Line Defenders responded to a surge in attacks against women human rights defenders (WHRDs), including sexual violence and assaults with weapons, particularly against those working on land rights, environmental protection, and peacebuilding. In one such case, four WHRDs were abducted by an armed militia as they held a workshop on sexual health and reproductive rights in South Kivu. They were held in an underground cell and subjected to acts of sexual violence and torture for a week before managing to escape during a clash between the militia and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. They subsequently continued to face intimidation and death threats via phone calls from members of armed groups which forced them to go into hiding. In August, the mother of WHRD Espérance Martha was shot dead by unidentified individuals at her home in Kalingi.

The environment for defending human rights was further undermined by internet shutdowns, movement restrictions, and systematic censorship by the National Intelligence Agency on social media platforms. Amidst catastrophic humanitarian shortages, defenders continued to document violations and provide critical aid, often serving as the sole source of verified information where international institutions could not operate, despite the severe risks of retaliation for exposing abuses. Defenders faced heightened xenophobia in Kinshasa, as they were accused of collaborating with Rwanda, while those attempting to flee to neighbouring countries risked refoulement.

1The Emergency Response Rooms of Sudan are grassroots networks that emerged in the wake of the war in Sudan. In 2025 they were awarded with the Rafto Prize.

By FDAPID (Foyer de Développement pour l'Autopromotion des Personnes Indigentes et en Détresse)

In the Wanyanga sector of the Walikale Territory in North Kivu Province, environmental defenders are constantly targeted because of claims1 related to the mining company ABM SA (Alphamin Bisie Mining SA), and the non-transparent management by local government of the 0.3% of ABM SA’s revenue which is legally required to be allocated to local community development.

In February 2025, the specifications outlining AMB SA’s social obligations related to this legal requirement expired. However, on the ground, the impact of the projects carried out was not visible. Concerned about the poverty of the population of Walikale, an area rich in natural resources, the Movement of Young Leaders for Change (JLC) denounced the situation by publishing images of the drilling operations which reportedly wasted USD$1,870,000. JLC members organised several meetings to analyse the DRC’s mining code and regulations, and subsequently adopted a strategy of flooding WhatsApp groups with critical messages to prevent the signing of a new set of specifications before the previous set had been evaluated.

JLC’s denunciation was supported by 82 civil society organisations through an advocacy letter addressed to the Congolese authorities, calling for an investigation into the disappearance of approximately USD$30,000,000 allocated to development projects between 2016 and 2024, while the population continued to live in precarious conditions. The organisations hoped that this pressure would block ABM SA from violating the mining law. However, allegations emerged that AMB SA may have exerted influence over the evaluation process for projects carried out during this four-year period. This evaluation was carried out over two days and the new specifications were signed the following day.

The criticisms of AMB SA and the authorities’ actions led to a smear campaign and death threats against JLC members, including Issa Butambo Aristote, Ushindi Balbiye Jean Calvin, Jimba Kalekela Lucien, Bwira Kabaki Bestron, Eugénie Bulenda Engel, Kahindo Macho Rachel, Moyoni Riziki Célestine, and Makuru Kashira Célestin. After receiving several threats via telephone calls and WhatsApp messages, the group was informed of a plan to kill eight JLC activists, with the source specifying that the assassins were already in Goma to carry out the killings. Some young JLC members and agents from the Wanyanga sector were also victims of cybercrime between 17 and 30 October when their WhatsApp accounts were hacked by a network of scammers. The FDAPID issued alerts to draw the attention of the authorities and human rights defender protection mechanisms to the situation of these environmental defenders. The National Assembly of the DRC has set up a parliamentary commission, whose report is still pending despite the legal deadline set by the Chamber's Rules of Procedure having now passed.

1The HRDs are demanding that AMB SA comply with their social obligations

By SUARAM Malaysia

In Malaysia, HRDs remained subject to investigations and charges for exercising their own rights or facilitating others’ exercise of constitutional freedoms of expression and assembly.

Authorities weaponised arrests as a first-line response, circumventing voluntary cooperation. This was typified by the Sedition Act arrests of student activists Fadhil Kasim, Aliff Danial, Sabir Syarafuddin, and Sudirman Arshad while at police stations on unrelated matters. Abdul Qayyum was arrested at home for online criticism and Aliefah Bobby at her workplace for her #JusticeforZara speech. Beyond arrests, police used extra-legal “intelligent statements" against student activists in Sabah to bypass Criminal Procedure Code protections. While Fadhil, Aliff and Sabir managed to refuse upon legal advice, Aliefah was denied counsel and subjected to the process in isolation. In a significant escalation, Suara Rakyat Malaysia’s (SUARAM) Sevan Doraisamy and Azura Nasron were charged under Section 5 of the Protected Areas and Protected Places Act (PAPPA) for facilitating a scheduled memorandum submission at the Home Ministry – an act that initially led to Sevan’s arrest. Following public scrutiny, their charges were postponed.

HRDs who were manhandled by police during protests were subsequently investigated under the Penal Code. Student activist Ahsanul Akmal Sulam was investigated for alleged use of force (Section 353) after an officer tore his shirt while seizing a flare. Similarly, Parti Sosialis Malaysia’s S. Arutchelvan was investigated and arrested for alleged use of force and mischief (Section 427), despite being pushed to the ground by officers. During the Papan village forced evictions, 13 activists – including Arutchelvan and SUARAM’s Jernell Tan – were arrested for alleged obstruction (Section 186) while peacefully defending residents' homes. In a separate pro-Palestinian protest, police arrested two HRDs under the same provision, despite video evidence showing officers feigning contact while one HRD attempted to de-escalate. Aside from being denied timely access to counsel in the early hours of detention, both HRDs’ privacy and presumption of innocence were further violated when the police posted a video online of them being ‘advised’ while detained.

In 2025, HRDs faced persistent reprisals for activism. Mukmin Nantang was investigated in February under Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act regarding his exposure of the forced evictions of the Bajau Laut community. Fadhil Kasim was charged that same month under Section 9(5) of the Peaceful Assembly Act and Section 509 of the Penal Code for an anti-corruption protest, later withdrawn following outcry. Political artist Fahmi Reza faced a Sabah travel ban in May and travel restriction to Singapore in

2025 saw multiple crackdowns on peaceful protest in dozens of countries, characterised by lethal violence, prolonged arbitrary detention, and the systematic criminalisation of dissent. Peaceful protesters who hold opposing viewpoints were treated as ‘enemies’ or ‘criminals’ amidst a wave of repression targeting demonstrators. The right to peacefully protest is a key mechanism which HRDs use to promote and defend a range of other human rights, and through it they can gain visibility, foster solidarity and enhance their legitimacy. However, successive steps have been taken in recent years to narrow the parameters of what is considered acceptable form of protest.

These restrictions have been institutionalised through new, sweeping legislation. States enacted laws that explicitly redefine peaceful assembly as a threat to national security or public order. In Benin, Law No. 2025-19 introduced penalties of up to one year's imprisonment for organisations that hold any "political stance". Incitement to ‘insults’ or ‘sedition’ is also punishable. An Interministerial Order issued in Côte d'Ivoire in October imposed a blanket ban on all public meetings and demonstrations for two months leading up to the presidential election, while Ecuador's Organic Law of National Solidarity broadened the definition of "internal armed conflict" to include all social mobilisations, legally permitting the state to treat protesters as armed combatants. In Peru, a State of Emergency declared in October suspended freedom of assembly and authorised the deployment of the Armed Forces to patrol streets, a measure mirrored in El Salvador where the prolonged state of emergency has facilitated nearly 85,000 arbitrary detentions. These legislative shifts are not merely regulatory adjustments but strategic tools designed to delegitimise protest before it occurs, transforming the act of assembling from a fundamental right into a prosecutable offence.

In addition to legislation, the use of excessive violence – including vehicle assaults, live ammunition, and tear gas – was a notable trend and resulted in the deaths and arbitrary detention of thousands. Despite these risks, a surge in public mobilisation occurred, driven in several countries by Gen Z, which refused to accept a status quo which they do not believe provides them with adequate life opportunities.

In Africa, the determination of some heads of state to prolong their rule caused resentment amongst a largely young population, who saw only the past on offer, rather than a future. The Gen Z movement in Togo mobilised huge demonstrations in June in response to growing frustrations with governance. Constitutional changes made in 2024 allowed for the creation of the Fifth Republic in May 2025, which in turn, permitted Faure Gnassingbé to extend his 20 year rule by assuming the position of ‘President of the Council of Ministers’, a role with no term limits. The protests were met with internet blackouts and a violent crackdown including arbitrary arrests, beatings, and reports of extrajudicial killings. In Madagascar, Gen Z protests driven by widespread dissatisfaction with the economy, led to a military coup and many cases of police brutality, while in Cote d’Ivoire, ahead of the October elections and the decision of 84 year old President Alassane Ouattara to run for a fourth term, an Interministerial Order banned public meetings and demonstrations for two months. The following day, at least 237 people were arrested at protests.

Image: 4 October 2025, Antananarivo, Madagascar – A protester appeals to security forces not to fire tear gas during the seventhday of demonstrations in Anosy, Antananarivo. The protests, led by Gen Z youth, university students, artists and influencers,called for the resignation of President Andry Rajoelina. © ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Live News.

In Kenya, youth-led demonstrations broke out in June, marking the anniversary of 2024’s protests against tax rises in which dozens of people were killed by security forces. The 2025 protests were also triggered by the death in custody of Albert Ojwanga, a blogger and teacher who had been arrested for criticising a senior police officer. Anger at the perceived unaccountability of the security forces, alongside economic grievances, fuelled the protests which, once again, were answered with deadly force, mass detentions, media blackouts and the arbitrary arrest of HRDs, including Mark Amiani, Mulingwa Nzau and Francis Mutunge Mwangi. In a July report, the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA) documented 65 deaths, as well as the injury of 342 civilians and 171 police officers. The report highlighted “significant breaches of constitutional policing standards, including use of disproportionate force, lack of professionalism, and failure to uphold public safety and rights”. It further pointed to the use of ‘goons’ to infiltrate the process, which “undermined the principles of peaceful assembly and contributed to escalation of violence, injuries, and fatalities.” In a comment which raises questions about the openness of the political establishment in Kenya to thoroughly investigate events and address allegations of excessive use of force by police, the Cabinet Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior rejected the criticisms in the report, stating “I am warning IPOA against passing judgment before investigations conclude.”

Between August and September, thousands of young Indonesians took to the streets to call for higher minimum wages, stronger job security, fair labour and tax reforms, and the passage of key laws to protect workers’ rights and democratic participation. The protests – which spread across 18 provinces and 39 subdistricts – were marked by police brutality and unlawful crowd-control tactics. The crackdown resulted in at least 10 civilian deaths, over 400 severe injuries, and approximately 4,000 arbitrary arrests. In the months following, HRDs accused of fomenting the protests, including Adetya ‘Dera’ Pramadira and Fathul Munif, were faced with targeted repression, red-tagging, digital surveillance, and baseless criminal accusations. They were arrested under vague and overly broad provisions, such as “incitement” under Article 160 of the Criminal Code and ‘hate speech’ under the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) law.

Youth-led protests also erupted in Morocco across Rabat, Casablanca, Agadir, Oujda, Tangier, and Fes, protesting the deterioration of social and economic rights. The state response was brutal: security forces employed vehicle assaults against crowds, killing some protesters, while thousands of young people, including minors, were arbitrarily detained. In Occupied Western Sahara, a number of peaceful assemblies in Laayoune were violently dispersed by the Moroccan authorities, including an attempted peaceful protest on International Human Rights Day on 10 December.

Protests triggered by inflation, the collapse in the value of the rial and the price of food began in Iran in late December, with the demonstrations spreading to dozens of cities by year end. The millions who would gather in the streets by mid-January 2026 would be met with one of the most brutal crackdowns in Iranian history, leaving tens of thousands of people dead or injured and thousands more arrested.

In Peru, massive demonstrations in October led to a 30-day state of emergency in Lima, authorising the Armed Forces to patrol streets; the crackdown resulted in dozens of injuries, the death of one protester, and the targeting of journalists covering the unrest. During a national strike in Ecuador, civil society documented over 473 injuries, 206 detentions, and 16 temporary disappearances. At least three people were killed, including Kichwa indigenous leader Efraín Fuerez, farmer Jose Alberto Guamán Izam, and Saraguro woman Rosa Elena Paqui, who died of cardiorespiratory arrest caused by tear gas inhalation. The repression of protests extended to the press, with journalists facing targeted violence and legal persecution. At least 55 journalists were attacked during the national strike, including indigenous reporter Edison Muenala, who was shot by the armed forces. In Guatemala, arrest warrants were issued in April against indigenous leader Héctor Chaclán and three other leaders of the 48 Cantones de Totonicapán, an indigenous Mayan organisation and legitimate authority of the people of Totonicapán in western Guatemala. The HRDs were accused of sedition, terrorism, illicit association, and obstruction of justice in charges which were widely viewed as a reprisal for their legitimate exercise of the right to protest and peaceful resistance.

2025 also saw waves of popular mobilisations in Argentina, marked by police repression and criminalisation of protesters and social movements. One such group were retirees who held weekly demonstrations in front of Congress to demand an increase of their pensions that would compensate for inflation and the decline in purchasing power. These demonstrations – held every Wednesday – generated significant public attention but no engagement by the government. Instead, Javier Milei's administration responded with institutional violence, ordering a heavy police presence and controls around Parliament on the grounds of maintaining public order. On several occasions demonstrations were broken up by the police, with more than 100 protesters arrested and dozens of older participants hurt. Several journalists and photojournalists were injured by pepper spray and other projectiles while covering the protests.

In South Asia, the administrative proscription of organisations including the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) in Pakistan and the Moolvasi Bachao Manch (MBM) in India has created a legal framework where association with a human rights movement or engaging in peaceful protests leads to serious negative legal and administrative consequences. These include bans on travel, difficulties in accessing banking services and restrictions of other civic rights without judicial review. In Pakistan, prominent defenders linked to the Baloch Yakjeeti Committee were listed under the 4th Schedule of the Anti-Terror Act, an administrative process that renders individuals devoid of basic civic rights. Beebarg Zehri was detained during a violent home raid, while Gulzadi Baloch faced extreme violence during her arrest. Meanwhile in Bangladesh, student protesters continued to be charged, even under the transition government.

The legislative assault on the right to protest in Europe has taken a distinctly technological, administrative quality. In the United Kingdom, the Crime and Policing Bill introduced in February further narrowed the scope of lawful protest by criminalising specific actions such as climbing war memorials, using flares, or concealing one's identity in police-designated areas, with penalties of up to one month's imprisonment. In Italy, Security Decree No. 1236, approved by the Senate in June, introduced stricter penalties for non-violent offences during protests such as property damage or road blockades, and granted greater impunity to police. In Germany, Berlin's amendment to the General Security and Order Act has authorised police to use AI software to analyse video data and identify "suspicious behaviour patterns" during protests, intensify digital surveillance (including access to end-to-end communications), and install monitoring software on devices – effectively merging protest policing with mass surveillance. In March, the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office filed a criminal case against five members of climate action group Last Generation under Section 129 of the German Criminal Code, accusing them of forming a criminal organisation. Concerns about the use of this ‘disproportionate’ charge against peaceful climate activists and its potential to cause “a wider criminalising and chilling impact on climate justice activism as a whole” were raised by UN human rights experts with the German government. The European human rights framework and the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of the right of peaceful assembly both make clear that protest is a protected democratic right, and that restrictions must be exceptional, lawful, necessary, proportionate, and limited to legitimate aims.

The repression of protests in 2025 was not applied uniformly; it was deeply intersectional, with women, Indigenous peoples, LGBTIQ+ defenders, and youth facing disparate and compounded forms of violence designed to exploit their specific vulnerabilities. WHRDs bore the brunt of gendered violence, particularly in custody. In Italy, seven female defenders were subjected to degrading gender-based abuse, including being forced to undress and squat with doors open under the supervision of male officers. In Mexico, WHRD Estela Hernández Jiménez suffered physical and sexual violence by police while documenting the arbitrary detention of youths. In Turkey, reports emerged of sexual abuse and harassment against female protesters. Indigenous defenders were targeted with a specific intensity aimed at erasing their territorial rights and cultural existence; in Ecuador, indigenous leader Efraín Fuerez and José Alberto Guamán Izama were killed during the national strike, while in Panama, Ngäbe-Buglé communities faced house-to-house persecution and pellet gunfire designed to repress legitimate protests against the potential reopening of the Cobre Panamá mine. A one-year-old indigenous girl died from tear gas inhalation. In Pakistan, the state employed "collective punishment" as a tactic against Baloch and Pashtun defenders, arresting and disappearing family members – including the fathers of Beebow Baloch and Dr. Sabiha Baloch – to coerce silence, while Dr. Mahrang Baloch was denied medical treatment in prison.

HRDs were targeted online through a sophisticated ecosystem of surveillance, algorithmic manipulation, and cyber-violence. States and non-state actors increasingly relied on digital tools to fabricate evidence, smear defenders, and justify their arrests. This trend was characterised by the convergence of artificial intelligence (AI), restrictive legislation, and the deliberate disruption of connectivity. The most common violations reported by HRDs through Front Line Defenders’ digital protection programme were: online surveillance or censorship (12.8% of all recorded digital violations); threats/harassment on social media (12.3%); phone surveillance (11.2%); threat of confiscation or interrogation (10%); and confiscated or destroyed devices (7.9%).

Front Line Defenders supported many cases in which deepfakes were used to damage the reputation of defenders, depicting them in fabricated scenarios such as sexually explicit situations, associating them with radical political statements, implicating them in financial fraud, or portraying them as agents for foreign influence. Across all regions, women, LGBTIQ+ defenders and indigenous human rights defenders were disproportionately targeted with sexualised or identity-based deepfakes designed to shame, discredit, or isolate them within their communities. Generative AI has allowed hostile actors to orchestrate defamatory campaigns in split-seconds, which can cause a break in trust between the targeted HRD and their current and potential audiences. Across all regions, content manipulated by AI is being used to undermine HRDs and the positions they defend, yet they most often do not have the resources to counteract such campaigns.

In Kazakhstan, WHRD Bakhytzhan Toregozhina was charged with ‘disseminating false information’ in relation to a series of Facebook posts in which the WHRD raised concerns over the deteriorating health and ongoing hunger strike of a political activist. Whilst in the process of being criminalised, a number of AI-generated images that mocked her appearance and portrayed her in a derogatory manner were posted online. The attackers falsely claimed to have evidence of her requesting financial incentives for her human rights work from a potential beneficiary. LGBTIQ+ defender Ardzh Tursynkan was also subjected to a smear campaign where AI-generated content was created to mock and degrade him in an effort to undermine his credibility.

Martha Lía Grajales was targeted in Venezuela by a defamation campaign aimed at discrediting her human rights work and justify her arbitrary detention and ongoing criminal case against her. As part of the defamation campaign, a video created with artificial intelligence was published to support the narrative that her human rights work is merely a cover for plotting against the government. The video was widely shared on social media and WhatsApp, with its dissemination amplified by coordinated networks of digital actors carrying out and amplifying such attacks.

In Türkiye, youth and LGBTIQ+ human rights defender Enes Hocaoğulları faced a widespread smear and hate online campaign after participating as Türkiye’s youth delegate to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, where he delivered several speeches. The campaign was marked by intersectional hate targeting both his activism and his sexual orientation, with attackers labelling him a traitor and foreign agent, and accusing him of seeking to “spread LGBTI+ ideology.”

Beyond disinformation, the digital space became a site of coordinated harassment and doxing, often inciting offline, violence particularly against WHRDs, indigenous and LGBTIQ+ defenders. In Syria, the Facebook account of WHRD Hiba Ezzideen Al-Hajii was hijacked or mimicked to launch a defamation campaign that urged followers to burn down her organisation's centre and harm her family. In Bangladesh, research commissioned by Front Line Defenders revealed that online harassment had evolved from isolated incidents into systemic, coordinated campaigns targeting defenders of women's, indigenous, and LGBTIQ+ rights following the 2024 political transition. In Guatemala, community media outlets Prensa Comunitaria and Ruda, made up of individuals of Mayan origin, faced sustained cyberattacks, including attempts to access reporters' private data and delete journalistic content, most likely as a result of their work exposing structural violence, violence against women, racial discrimination and forced migration. Co-founder of Prensa Comunitaria Nelton Rivera was specifically targeted with intimidation and calls for his detention.

There remains a significant gap in sustained and meaningful engagement between technology companies and the communities affected by their platforms. Although some channels exist for human rights organisations working with HRDs at risk, direct dialogue between companies and affected communities and human rights defenders is largely absent. This limits companies’ understanding of the real-world impacts of their systems on HRDs and undermines the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures. In this context, civil society organisations are often placed in a role of informal intermediaries, providing support to HRDs in, for instance, restoring accounts hacked or suspended, or trying to take down defamatory posts. However, responses from platforms may be delayed, generic, or entirely absent, and in some cases, interpretations of platform policies may be influenced by political considerations. This further complicates access to remedy and effective protection.

Furthermore, the rollback of Diversity, Equality and Inclusion policies in Big Tech has narrowed support avenues available for HRDs exposed to online harassment, as entire teams in major social media platforms have been diluted or disbanded. In addition to fewer channels of support, there is also now less expertise on human rights and, in particular, human rights defenders. Context-blind automated moderation frequently removes human rights documentation, images, videos, and testimonies of abuses, while leaving up coordinated harassment and hate campaigns targeting defenders.

Advanced surveillance and tracking was widely used, with state and non-state actors alike dedicating significant resources to track human rights defenders. While China is widely known for its use of AI-enhanced tools to identify dissenters and ethnic minorities, emerging reports suggest that other states, including India, are utilising AI-driven mapping technologies to systematically identify and track human rights defenders, creating a digital "panopticon" effect where the mere act of organising online becomes a risk. In India, security forces have started using software that predicts where crimes may occur and who the perpetrators may be. This practice, as highlighted by Tripti Bhushan, is deeply problematic because it “reallocates discretionary authority from the judiciary and police to impenetrable algorithms with no accountability”.

Intelligence cells from Nicaragua operating in Costa Rica and elsewhere intercepted communications and conducted digital surveillance on exiled defenders, including those supported by Fundación Sin Límites, to map and monitor their transnational networks. Crucially, these tactics extend to the infiltration of supposedly secure communication channels. In the United States, the FBI infiltrated a private Signal group chat used by migrant rights defenders in New York City to monitor immigration cases. Confidential information extracted from this encrypted channel was subsequently used in law enforcement reports that labelled these defenders as "extremist actors," demonstrating how state actors are bypassing technical security measures to compromise the safety of those relying on digital tools for protection.

Many HRDs and human rights organisations have no choice but to use equipment that has stopped receiving technical support due to planned obsolescence policies of technology companies. This situation places them in a state of critical vulnerability to digital threats, aggravated by the difficulties they face in obtaining funding for the purchase of new hardware or software licenses.

This digital surveillance apparatus is particularly lethal in conflict zones and for defenders in marginalised communities. In Sudan, the ongoing conflict saw both warring parties establish dedicated electronic units to monitor social media, hack emails, and spread disinformation. Defenders were frequently accused of "supporting the enemy" based on innocuous online posts, while fake pages impersonating them were used to publish private photos and incite hate speech, exploiting defenders' lack of digital literacy and outdated devices. Defenders like A.A. (a trade union activist) and M.A. (a defender in Kampala) were targeted based on intelligence gathered from their digital footprints, with militias routinely checking phones at checkpoints to extract data on victims and collaborators.

The boundary between physical and digital surveillance often blurs in the spaces where human rights defenders are operating, with raids often resulting in the seizure of critical digital tools. In Morocco, security forces raided the homes of Sahrawi defenders from ASVDH and CODESA, confiscating documentation equipment to disrupt their monitoring work. In Guinea Conakry, a journalist going by the pseudonym of Sally had her home broken into and her phone confiscated, cutting her off from her networks and exposing information regarding the communities she serves.

The role of technology firms further illustrates this convergence. In 2025, a list of companies aiding Israel's settlement enterprise and military actions in the OPT was published by the United Nations. It was identified that human rights defenders working to document violations, challenge dispossession, or support affected communities were often perceived as disrupting these systems and may face surveillance, harassment, arbitrary detention, and other forms of retaliation. Partnerships involving companies, including Palantir Technologies, highlight how data-driven tools are being integrated into security operations.

Internet shutdowns and infrastructure attacks were used by states to isolate defenders and prevent documentation. The civil society #KeepItOn coalition recorded 52 states where internet shutdowns occurred in 2025. In Togo, data confirmed a deliberate filtering of content on YouTube, Facebook, and Signal during the June protests, obstructing activists from coordinating safe passage or documenting police violence. In Sudan, telecommunications were disrupted in RSF-controlled areas, forcing reliance on Starlink, which was reportedly controlled by RSF intelligence, effectively censoring the reporting of violations.

WHRDs working across multiple issues continue to face intersecting and distinctively gendered threats. In 2025, these attacks were associated with significant democratic and rights setbacks, where governments and corporate interests increasingly acted in ways that undermined protections for women’s and minorities’ rights. Fuelled by organised anti-gender movements and the profit-driven expansion of extractive and tech industries, state and non-state actors have deployed a coordinated arsenal to silence WHRDs challenging the status quo. Across the globe, WHRDs were subjected to sexual violence, rape, and sexualised harassment both online and offline as tools of intimidation, punishment, and economic dispossession.

Indigenous women and those defending minority rights face intersectional violence that combines racism, sexism, and the defence of territory. In Guatemala, women from the Chirrix Tzul community, including members of the Comité Campesino del Altiplano (CCDA), have been subjected to sexual assault, forced eviction, and criminalisation by armed groups linked to land grabbing. In Argentina, the government has rolled back women's rights while judicially harassing WHRDs defending indigenous peoples’ rights. This occurred amid a wider pattern of criminalisation of the Mapuche Tehuelche people, which intensified when a judge ordered 12 simultaneous raids on communities and private homes in the Andes Mountains of Chubut Province. In a violent operation involving up to 200 officers, numerous abuses and irregularities were committed, culminating in the arrest of WHRD Victoria Núñez at the Pillañ Mahuiza Mapuche community. Núñez, the only person to be arrested in the raids, was detained on fabricated charges of participating in an arson attack, despite GPS data and witness testimony proving she was 80 kilometres away from the incident site at the time.

In Afghanistan, DRC, and Sudan, WHRDs were at the forefront of resistance, paying a heavy price for their courage. In conflict-affected regions, WHRDs face the dual burden of generalised violence and targeted gendered attacks, often serving as the sole providers of humanitarian aid and documentation where international mechanisms are absent. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the escalation of conflict since January 2025 has placed WHRDs on the frontlines of a humanitarian catastrophe. Six WHRDs from a grassroots peace organisation in Fizi and Mwenga were arrested, interrogated, and later abducted by the Twigwaneho armed group; the WHRD Nabwija Furaisha was executed in front of her colleagues April. In Sudan, WHRDs faced threats of kidnapping their children and sexual violence by security forces; a young woman human rights defender who was supporting people with disabilities and facilitating their relocation between villages in Aljazera and Wed Madani was targeted by the RSF. As she moved from village to village distributing aid, an RSF officer detained her and raped her several times. This case is emblematic of how WHRDs are accused of supporting one warring faction (SAF) when in one territory, and the opposing faction (RSF) when in another, with their bodies becoming extensions of the battlefields.

Similar patterns are evident in Myanmar, where WHRDs documenting ethnic cleansing and military atrocities face arbitrary detention and sexual violence by armed groups. In Afghanistan, four years after the Taliban takeover, HRDs, especially women, continue to find ways to engage in human rights work and speak out against Taliban policies. As reported by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Afghanistan, “one of the most visible manifestations of Taliban repression has been the systematic targeting of women human rights defenders, lawyers, protesters, journalists and their allies through harassment, arbitrary arrests, detention and ill-treatment.” WHRDs operating underground face the total erasure of their rights and the risk of extrajudicial killing by the Taliban. Afghan defenders have also been forcibly deported from Pakistan and denied visa extensions, despite documented violence and risk of reprisals in Afghanistan, especially against women and girls.

Image: 2025, Nouakchott, Mauritania – Human rights defender andanti-slavery activist Warda Ahmed Souleimane in a cell atNouakchott Women’s Prison. © Private

Beyond the physical violence, WHRDs faced criminalisation, harassment and intimidation. In Mauritania, anti-slavery activist Warda Ahmed Souleimane was arrested following a call for peaceful mobilisation against systemic discrimination. Journalist and writer Pham Doan Trang marked her fifth year of a nine-year sentence in Vietnam for “anti-state propaganda” in relation to an investigation she published on the circumstances around a land dispute which resulted in a deadly police raid on a village near Hanoi in 2020. In Serbia, Ljiljana Nešić, president of the women's rights organisation Žene Za Mir (Women for Peace), faced a targeted home invasion and ransacking in Leskovac in December. The attack occurred days after she appeared on television highlighting the number of femicides in Leskovac and Jablanica districts, and the failure of authorities to protect women and combat gender-based violence. Unidentified individuals broke into her home, and ransacked it, but stole nothing, indicating the attack was a deliberate act of intimidation rather than a burglary. This incident forms part of a sustained pattern of harassment against Nešić and her colleague Marija Trajković, which over the years has included cyber-attacks, smear campaigns, physical stalking, and non-verbal threats such as damaging their vehicles and making their pets disappear.

LGBTIQ+ defenders continued to face threats for advocating for the right to live openly and freely. This also impacts on how they engage in advocacy and report attacks against them; multiple cases of attacks against LGBTIQ+ defenders occurred in 2025 which Front Line Defenders cannot publicly report on due to the risk the defenders still face.

Across the globe, states deployed a coordinated strategy of criminalisation and erasure, increasingly labelling international LGBTIQ+ movements and members as "extremist" or "foreign agents" to delegitimise their work and justify the dissolution of local organisations. This narrative is weaponised alongside restrictive foreign funding laws, which unduly frame international solidarity as a threat to national sovereignty, leading to the forced closure of NGOs, the freezing of assets, and the detention of LGBTIQ+ defenders under the guise of combating "foreign interference".

“Pro-family" rhetoric and morality laws are being used to dismantle the critical work and legal existence of LGBTIQ+ defenders and their organisations. This trend represents an expansion beyond social stigma to include state-sanctioned criminalisation, where the mere act of organising or advocating for gender diversity is framed as a threat to national security or public order. In Türkiye, the government declared 2025 the "Year of the Family" to combat "genderlessness," leading to the court-ordered dissolution of the organisation Genç LGBTI+ on grounds of "obscenity" for social media illustrations, while in Hungary, Pride marches were effectively banned through legislative amendment. In Romania, the Oradea City Hall refused to authorise a Pride march for the third consecutive year, blocking activists with security forces and issuing fines. In the United States, nearly 200 state-level bills restrict gender-affirming care, while the elimination of federal protections has emboldened conservative actors to target defenders with impunity. In Burkina Faso, the new Code of Persons and the Family explicitly criminalises "homosexuality and related practices" with prison terms of up to 10 years, creating a legal framework that legitimises violence against the community. In Kazakhstan, efforts to adopt a law against so-called “LGBT propaganda” moved forward, with the Lower House of Parliament voting through legislative amendments in November. These amendments would ban the "dissemination of information containing propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation and paedophilia" in the media and online. The debate and voting process lasted a total of 15 minutes. The bill is currently pending in the Senate.

Image: 28 June 2025, Budapest, Hungary – People march during the Gay Pride parade. Despite a law introduced by Prime MinisterViktor Orbán banning it, thousands of members of Hungary’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex LGBTQ+community paraded to celebrate diversity. © Giuseppe Lian / Sintesi / Alamy Live News.

These legal frameworks do not exist in a vacuum, and the rollback on protections has also been reflected in the high level of physical violence faced by LGBTIQ+ defenders, characterised by extreme brutality, torture, sexual violence, and trans-femicides intended to erase trans identities and deter collective action. A stark example is the case of María Mendoza Lucas, a trans woman, dancer, and Indigenous land defender in Oaxaca, Mexico, who was disappeared in October 2025 for six months. Her targeting highlights the intersectional risks faced by trans Indigenous women who challenge extractive economies and are denied rights based on their trans identities. Since 2016, the Human Rights Defenders Memorial has documented 55 trans-femicides of (W)HRDs in Latin America, with cases in Mexico, Colombia, and Honduras, among others.

In Ghana, the defender Texas faced an arson attempt on his home and eviction threats after staging a demonstration against the Anti-LGBTIQ+ Bill. In Türkiye, activists participating in banned Pride marches faced police violence, arbitrary arrests, and reports of sexual abuse and harassment in detention, illustrating the role of state forces in physically punishing sexual and gender minorities.

The digital realm has become a primary battlefield where LGBTIQ+ defenders are targeted with doxing and deepfakes to delegitimise their work before physical attack or criminalisation occur. In Tunisia in February, trans WHRD Mira Ben Salah was subjected to a smear campaign and doxing that extended to her family, yet state authorities failed to provide protection against the incitement of violence. In October the organisation she works for, Damj - the Tunisian Association for Justice and Equality, declared a ‘Queer State of Emergency’ following the arrest of 71 LGBTIQ+ persons, “most of whom are transgender women”.

Despite the escalating risks, national protection mechanisms frequently fail to recognise the specific vulnerabilities of LGBTIQ+ defenders, leading to institutional exclusion and police complicity in violence. Such defenders are often forced to rely on their communities for protection from violence and support, especially in instances where national protection mechanisms to not cater to their specific needs and risks. Across the globe, the absence of public policies that recognise LGBTIQ+ people as rights-holders, combined with the systematic denial of their identity by state institutions, leaves defenders without legal recourse or safety guarantees.

By Basma Mostafa, Law and Democracy Support Foundation

Image: 4 December 2025, Brussels, Belgium – Egyptian WHRD Basma Mostafa of Law and Democracy Support Foundationaddresses the European Parliament on transnational repression, © European Parliament, courtesy of LDSF

Transnational Repression (TNR) is increasingly used by repressive states to silence human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists in exile. At the Law and Democracy Support Foundation (LDSF), we document Egypt’s multi-layered TNR practices. The following cases illustrate the central patterns:

Ahmed Salem, Director of the Sinai Foundation for Human Rights and a UK-based HRD, has been targeted since February 2024 following his organisation’s reporting on military activity and the construction of a fortified zone in North Sinai. State aligned media accused him of espionage, while intermediaries close to Egyptian security agencies warned he would be “brought back to Egypt,” with a government-aligned Sinai clan leader asserting he “is not far from reach even abroad.” His family inside Egypt remains at risk.

Karim Abdelrady, a Berlin-based human rights lawyer and Executive Director of LDSF, has also been targeted through proxy retaliation, with a relative in Egypt arbitrarily detained for nearly 18 months in direct reprisal for his human rights work. After participating in a peaceful protest against President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s 2022 official visit to Berlin, Abdelrady was subjected to surveillance, and later received direct threats, including warnings that his children could be harmed.

Basma Mostafa, a Berlin-based HRD and Director of Programs at LDSF, has faced one of the most extensively documented TNR campaigns. Before fleeing Egypt in 2020, she survived repeated arrests and an enforced disappearance for reporting on police abuses. After exile, she was interrogated, surveilled, and faced attempts at forced return in Lebanon and Kenya. In Germany, she endured physical assault, stalking, doxing, digital attacks, and gender based threats. A German police report linked her 2022 attacker to an Egyptian diplomat, providing rare contemporaneous evidence of embassy linked intimidation on German soil. Her case has been officially recognised in an allegation letter signed by five UN Special Procedures mandate holders, who described her situation as “continued harassment and transnational repression by Egyptian State agents or actors operating on their behalf or with their acquiescence.” Threats escalated after her attacker’s 2025 arrest in the UK, including messages promising “punishment” and kidnapping. In June 2024, while conducting advocacy with UN bodies in Geneva, she was followed to her hotel and directly threatened with arrest by a man claiming to be a police officer, an incident reported to Swiss authorities and cited by UN mandates as part of her transnational repression case. Her case was later included in the UN Secretary-General’s reprisals report, confirming that she was targeted for engaging with UN mechanisms.

Beyond HRD cases, LDSF has documented broader patterns targeting political opponents, academics, and researchers through proxy intimidation, digital harassment, surveillance, smear campaigns, consular obstruction, and the weaponisation of in absentia trials producing terrorism-related sentences without due process. Egypt’s Terrorist Entities Law (Law No. 8/2015) has also become a central legal tool in this system of Transnational repression, applied not only inside Egypt but increasingly against defenders in exile. The law enables authorities to place individuals on terrorism lists, impose renewable three-year blacklisting, freeze assets and civil registry status, and obstruct access to passports and essential documents turning what was presented as counter-terrorism legislation into a punitive mechanism targeting Egyptians abroad as well as those inside the country. We further note that Egyptian diplomatic missions have been misused as operational hubs for TNR, in parallel with cross border security cooperation with Lebanon, Tunisia, Kenya, and Turkey. As a founding member of the Coalition Against Transnational Repression in Germany, LDSF contributed to securing the German government’s first ever acknowledgment of TNR in its May 2025 coalition agreement and co-authored a policy paper outlining concrete protection and accountability measures for host states. While these recommendations were designed for Germany, they are applicable to any European country hosting exiled human rights defenders.

The proliferation of legislation designed to restrict the right to defend rights or tighten control of the state over civil society showed no signs of slowing down in 2025. Such laws are detrimental to the survival of independent civil society and civic activism, with a particular impact on those supporting gender equality and LGBTIQ+ rights. The below is a non-exhaustive list of legislation proposed or introduced by states in 2025, which Front Line Defenders encountered in its work.

Africa

Benin

The Law on Associations, Law No. 2025-19, introduced on 22 July 2025 increases state control of associations’ and organisations’ affairs. Article 50 requires associations to contribute to “peace, harmonious coexistence, and good governance”. Any ‘political stance’ or incitement to violence, insults, or sedition is prohibited.

Burkina Faso

The Code of Persons and the Family (CPF) was adopted in September, giving authorities the power to revoke nationality in vague and ambiguous circumstances, including “when [citizens] have committed acts on behalf of a foreign state that are incompatible with their status as Burkinabe and prejudicial to the interests of Burkina Faso”.

Article 210-3 stipulates that: "Homosexuality and related practices are prohibited”. Any person found guilty of engaging in homosexual acts or promoting ‘homosexual practices’ faces two years imprisonment and a hefty fine. In the event of a repeat offence, the penalties are doubled.

A decree enacted in November requires all approved NGOs to open and maintain their cash accounts exclusively with the state-controlled Treasury Deposit Bank. Failure to comply results in the withdrawal of accreditation and/or administrative and financial penalties

Ethiopia

Amendments to the 2019 Civil Society Organisations Proclamation were proposed by the Ministry of Justice which, among other measures, would restrict groups engaged in governance or electoral work from accepting foreign funding. Foreign and foreign-established organisations also would be barred from these activities.

Zambia

The Cyber Security Act 2025 and the Cyber Crimes Act 2025 were enacted in April and gave government officials enhanced surveillance powers over online communications. The acts also raise concerns over restrictions on freedom of expression; Article 22 of the Cyber Crimes Act outlaws the dissemination of “information, statement or image, knowing the same to be false that – (a) causes damage to the reputation of another person; or (b) subjects another person to public ridicule, contempt, hatred or embarrassment”.

Americas

Argentina

The Milei government issued a number of decrees that weaken labour rights, including the right to strike, and weaken environmental legislation. This includes the Glacier Law, which removes the automatic protection currently afforded to glaciers and opens up the possibility of mining and other productive uses, putting the environment at risk, as well as local Mapuche indigenous communities that live in this ecosystem. The government also proposed removing important safeguards for the rights of women and diverse populations, such as removing the crime of femicide from the penal code.

Canada

In June, Bill 5 (Protect Ontario by Unleashing our Economy Act) was approved by the Ontario Government despite widespread condemnation by environmental, indigenous and labour rights defenders. Bill 5 could open the door to the designation of the Ring of Fire, a mineral-rich region in Northern Ontario, as a “special economic zone”, ignoring environmental regulations, bypassing First Nations and increasing the presence of extractive projects.

Ecuador

The Organic Law on Social Transparency was introduced and approved in less than 30 days, granting the administration broad supervisory powers with vague formulations that may enable mechanisms for monitoring, sanctioning or suspending NGOs under unclear criteria.

The Organic Law of National Solidarity broadened the definition of "internal armed conflict" to include all social mobilisations, legally permitting the state to treat protesters as armed combatants.

El Salvador

The Foreign Agents Law, which entered into force on 10 June, requires organisations and individuals receiving international funding to register as 'foreign agents' and pay 30 per cent tax on the funds received. In addition to containing language which stigmatises human rights work, it leaves the door open to provisions that could restrict the right to freedom of expression and association, as well as inhibit human rights work performed in the country.

Peru

The Ley APCI regulatory framework significantly increased state control over civil society organisations that receive international cooperation funds, shifting the role of the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI) from one of coordination to one of pre-approval. It requires NGOs and other entities to register with APCI and obtain prior authorisation before implementing any plans, programmes, projects, or activities financed through international technical cooperation. The regulation classifies as a “very serious” offence the use of international cooperation resources to advise, assist, or finance legal, administrative, judicial, or international actions against the Peruvian State. This provision holds the potential to deter and penalise NGOs that provide legal support to victims, engage in strategic litigation, or challenge state actions through advocacy or judicial processes.

USA

In September President Trump issued the Presidential Memorandum ‘Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organised Political Violence’, targeting ‘domestic terrorists’ and ‘anti-fascists’ whose common ideologies include ‘anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, and anti-Christianity’. The memorandum stated that the financing networks of such vaguely defined groups – including ‘institutional and individual funders’ and ‘non-governmental organisations’ – would be targeted. In a similar vein, in June the House Committee on Homeland Security and Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability launched a probe into more than 200 non-governmental organizations, alleging that such groups were “providing services to inadmissible aliens”.

Asia and the Pacific

Bangladesh

The draft Cyber Protection Ordinance (CPO), designed to replace the repressive Digital Security Act (DSA), was gazetted in May. While the draft removes the criminalisation of defamation, it retains the broadly worded clause criminalising speech that “publishes or promotes anything in cyberspace that incites religious or communal hatred or ethnic hostility, or that provokes violence, causes panic, or directs criminal activity”. This retention is concerning given the DSA's history of being weaponised to silence human rights defenders and dissent. Furthermore, the CPO grants the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) sweeping powers to block content deemed to undermine "national unity," "security," or "religious values" upon law enforcement request, without judicial oversight.

China

New Provisions on the Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures of State Security Authorities and the Public Security Organs Procedural Rules for Handling Criminal Cases have significantly expanded the Chinese state’s extraterritorial reach. They grant authorities the power to inspect electronic devices, monitor personal communications and criminalise contact with foreign organisations under vague definitions of “espionage”, “endangering national security” and “harm to national interests”. They apply regardless of where the alleged offence occurs or the nationality of the individual, effectively extending the 2023 Anti-Espionage Law beyond Chinese borders.

In Hong Kong in June, amendments to the Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance granted the local government broad powers to deny registration or dissolve unions deemed a “risk to national security”, prohibit individuals previously charged under national-security laws from holding union positions, and ban unions from receiving foreign funding without official approval.

Indonesia

In November the House of Representatives passed the new Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) which entered into force on 2 January 2026. Article 240 penalises insults against the Government or State Institutions, prescribing a prison sentence of up to three years if the insult results in public unrest.

Europe and Central Asia

Georgia

The Law on Registration of Foreign Agents (FARA) was enacted in April, requiring individuals or organisations seen as acting in the interest of a foreign entity – often based on the receipt of foreign funding – to register as foreign agents.

Germany

In December, the Berlin House of Representatives amended the General Security and Order Act, giving extensive additional powers to the police. The amendment will allow police to use AI software to analyse video data to identify “suspicious behaviour patterns”, intensify digital surveillance with access to end-to-end communications and emails. Police will also be permitted to physically and secretly enter properties to install spyware or other software to monitor and extract communication data.

Hungary

Amendments made in March to the law on assembly in relation to the protection of children were used to ban Pride marches. A march in Budapest went ahead anyway and attracted 100,000 people after the Mayor of Budapest announced it would be held as a municipal event.

Italy

In June, the Senate approved Security Decree no 1236. The law contains stricter penalties for non-violent offences during protests, such as defacing property, and for the disruption of public order, including road blockades and sit-ins. A number of UN Special Procedures mandate holders expressed their concern that “[p]rovisions of the decree appear to limit the ability for individuals, including human rights defenders, to assemble peacefully for protests and demonstrations, and its vague phrasing could result in arbitrary prosecutions and harsh penalties with unduly severe consequences for people exercising their rights”.

Kazakhstan

In December, the Senate voted to adopt legislative amendments that ban the “dissemination of information containing propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation and paedophilia” in the media and online.

Kyrgyzstan

The law on Mass Media, which was signed into law in August, grants excessive control over media outlets and online platforms including mandatory registration for all media outlets and foreign ownership restrictions.

United Kingdom

In February, the government introduced a new Crime and Policing Bill to the House of Commons which, if passed, will further criminalise actions during protests. Climbing war monuments and memorials, use of flares and fireworks, and covering one’s face in a way that would conceal one’s identity in areas designated by police would be punishable by a fine of up to £1,000, and, in the latter instance, up to one month of imprisonment.

Türkiye

An amendment was proposed to Article 225 (Indecent Act) of the Turkish Penal Code which would undermine the rights of LGBTIQ+ persons and increase the risks associated with the defence of such rights. The sentence for publicly engaging in “sexual relations or exhibitionism” would be increased to three years of imprisonment, though no definition of ‘exhibitionism’ is provided. Furthermore, a new paragraph is included which states, “anyone who exhibits an attitude or behaviour that is contrary to the biological sex at birth and public morality, or who publicly encourages, praises or promotes such behaviour, shall be punished with imprisonment from one to three years”.

Middle East and North Africa

Iran

In June, during the 12-day war with Israel, the Iranian Parliament voted to increase the punishment for charges related to “espionage” under amendments made to its Espionage Law. Any form of espionage for Israel, the US or other actors considered hostile is now punishable by death, while any propaganda activities considered hostile or to undermine Iran’s national security can be punished with up to 15 years in prison. If done in collaboration with an actor considered hostile to Iran, the death penalty can be handed down.

Additionally, the law states that “sending videos and images to hostile or foreign networks that, if published, would typically weaken public morale, create division, or harm national security, will be punishable by a Fifth-degree prison sentence [2 – 5 years of imprisonment], and permanent dismissal from government and public services, and illegal protests and gatherings during wartime will be punishable by a Fourth-degree prison sentence [5-10 years of imprisonment].”

Israel

The bill to Prevent the Operation of Organisations that Receive Funding from Foreign Entities and Engage in Political Activity, was introduced into law in early 2025. The legislation prohibits organisations that receive more than a modest threshold of their funding from foreign governments from engaging in political activity, effectively criminalising core human rights advocacy such as litigation, policy critique, and public campaigning. The law strips these organisations of legal standing before the High Court of Justice, preventing them from challenging government actions or seeking judicial review, while imposing draconian registration and reporting requirements.

The amendment to the Entry into Israel Law, which entered into force in January 2025, grants the Minister of Interior broad discretionary powers to deny entry to foreign nationals and representatives of NGOs who are perceived to "incite violence," support the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, or campaign against Israeli policies.

The "ICC Law", which passed a preliminary reading in the Knesset in February, imposes prison sentences of up to five years on any unauthorised information sharing with the ICC. If the information was classified, the culprit is liable to life imprisonment.