Preventing a direct attack: Different protection outcomes

1. Changes in the perpetrator's behaviour: Deterring attackers by increasing the potential costs of an attack 2. Confronting and reducing threats (by acting direstly against the source, or against any action taken by the source) Changes in duty-bearer stakeholdsers' compliance with the UNDeclaration on HRD: Dissuading attackers by improving the liklihood of authorities taking action to protect defenders or to punish the perpetartors of an attack 3. Confronting and reducing threats (by acting direstly against the source, or against any action taken by the source) Reducing the feasibility of the attack: Reducing defenders' exposure, improving your working environment, managing fear and stress properly, developing security plans, etc. Reducing vulnerabilities, enhancing capacities

When a threat is made and you want to reduce the risk associated with it, it is important to act - not just against the threat itself, but also on the vulnerabilities and capacities most closely linked to the threat. At times of great pressure, when you want to react as quickly as possible, you often act on the vulnerabilities which are easiest to deal with or closest to hand instead of those which are most relevant to the threat.

Be careful: If the risk of attack is high (that is, if the threat is strong and real, and there are several vulnerabilities and fewer capacities), working on vulnerabilities or capacities to reduce the risk makes little sense, because these require time to change and become functional. If the risk is very high (a direct and severe attack is imminent) you can only do three things to avoid it:

1. Immediately and effectively confront the threat, knowing that you can achieve an immediate and specific result which will prevent the attack (Usually it is very difficult to be sure that there will be an immediate and effective result, because reactions take time, and time is precious in this situation)

2. Reduce your exposure to as close to zero as possible, by going into hiding or leaving the area.

3. Another option might be seeking armed protection, assuming that armed protection is close at hand (immediate), can deter the potential attacker and does not put the defender in more danger in the medium or long term (realistically, such requirements of armed protection are very difficult to fulfil!). Sometimes a Government offers armed escorts to a defender, after national or international pressure; in these cases, accepting or rejecting the escort may have to do with holding the state accountable for the security of defenders, but in no way can a Government say that they are relieved of their responsibilities if the defender does not accept the armed escorts. Private security companies may lead to more risk if they are informally linked to State forces (see chapter 9). And for defenders to carry weapons we must say that it is usually ineffective against an organized attack, and also may make defenders vulnerable if a Government uses it as a pretext to attack them on the basis of fighting terrorism or insurgency.

Threatening situations that can lead to an attack are easier to handle if other relevant actors or stakeholders become involved and work together. Examples include a functioning judicial system; support networks (domestic and international) that can put political pressure on duty-bearer stakeholders; social networks (within or among organisations), personal and family networks, UN/international peacekeepers, etc.